Why it matters
Indiana's first data-center filing under its 2025 large-load law shows where Google's obligation to cover power costs ends. Indiana's utility commission put $73.8 million of network upgrades into the transmission rate base that all customers pay toward and declined to require Google to pay down the balance if it leaves.
Tap a figure for the line in its source.
AES Indiana gives Google
- of new load served by the end of 2029 under a 15-year electric service agreement, from AES Indiana's whole system, after about a year of temporary service
- of new four-hour batteries at three sites, and 130 of solar, that AES Indiana acquires or builds through tax-equity joint ventures to serve the load — $641.4M net of tax equity, inside the $737.3M project
- of network upgrades — new 345 kV lines and substations — which go into AES Indiana's transmission rate base and are allocated to all customers; Google's rates cover their yearly cost during the contract
Google gives AES Indiana
- of the project's yearly cost, generation and transmission, even at its minimum demand: demand and energy charges by calendar year at confidential rates, on what AES's release calls an '80% minimum demand obligation'
- for the facilities that connect its site, paid up front during construction whether or not it ever takes the service, with credit support; and the cost of the temporary line
- above the cost of serving it over the contract, by AES's own confidential model — about $300M at its minimum demand, $770M at full forecast demand — which AES credits to its other customers and calls their savings
- an exit fee if it ends the contract early, which it may do only after a set date and on written notice; the amount is confidential
What happened
AES Indiana, the utility for Indianapolis, will power Google's planned data center in Monrovia, in Morgan County southwest of the city. The contract runs for at least 15 years. AES plans to supply 390 megawatts of new demand by the end of 2029. AES is adding two battery plants, a solar farm with a battery and new high-voltage lines. Together they cost $737.3 million. Indiana's utility commission approved the contract on October 7, 2026. It was the first data-center filing under a 2025 state law. The law requires large new customers to cover at least 80% of the project costs reasonably assigned to them. AES says Google pays 100% of the cost of those additions. AES says the deal will save its other customers about $770 million. The order requires Google's rates to cover the project's full yearly cost even if Google uses only its minimum. The Commission also put $73.8 million of network upgrades into the transmission rate base, the costs every customer pays toward through rates. The Commission did so over the Citizens Action Coalition's objection. Google pays the $32.3 million site connection cost up front. AES's $770 million projection assumes Google uses its full capacity. At Google's minimum use, AES projects savings of about $300 million. Google's rates, minimum demand and exit fee are confidential.
Sources 19 documents — 6 company releases · 5 other documents · 4 regulatory filings · 3 SEC filings · 1 government statement
Research trail Found 48 documents and read 45 of them while checking this deal and related ones.
- States 8 figures: parties · approval · 80% statute · 460 MW resources · 100% annual cost recovery · exit · cost overruns · confidential
- States 2 figures: announced · term
- States 2 figures: 390 MW load · rate case
- States 2 figures: $737.3M project cost · $770M fixed cost contribution
- States 2 figures: $73.8M network upgrades · $32.3M direct connection
- States transmission
- States 80% minimum demand
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The record's own summary of its sourcing: IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026; read through a Wayback snapshot of the Commission's own copy); AES Indiana's verified petition (Apr 22 2026) and Rogers's and Raney's direct testimony; CAC's public testimony (Inskeep, Jun 17 2026); IPALCO 10-K for 2025 (Mar 2 2026) and 10-Q for Q3 2026 (Nov 3 2026); The AES Corporation's 10-Q for Q3 2026; AES Indiana's data-centers page, releases (Apr 23 and Oct 7 2026), Morgan County transmission page, 2025 IRP release and its president's op-ed (IBJ, Oct 23 2026); WFYI (Oct 12 2026), WTHR (Oct 13 2026), IPM (Jul 14 2026) and IBJ via the Daily Journal (Oct 17 2025) for the contested cells; Google's pledge (Mar 4 2026) for the note (read 2026-11) · as of Nov 2026
The evidence 18 sourced figures · 10 disputes
The record's headline AES Indiana–Google: power for 390 of new load at Google's Monrovia data center under a contract of at least 15 years — the first data center filed under Indiana's 2025 large-load law, approved Oct 7 2026, with rates set to recover 100% of the $737.3M project's yearly cost even at Google's minimum demand and its $32.3M connection paid up front, while $73.8M of network upgrades enter the rate base all customers share; the $770M of 'customer savings' AES advertises is its own confidential model, and its $1.3B is in no filing
- Size
- 390 MW of new load by end-2029 · 15-year ESA ('at a minimum of 15 years', per AES) · $737.3M Monrovia Project, net of tax equity: $641.4M for 460 MW of four-hour batteries and 130 MW of solar + $73.8M of network upgrades + $22.1M of planning and development · $32.3M direct connection, prepaid by Google · ESA rates ≥ 100% of the project's yearly cost even at minimum demand · AES's modeled contribution above incremental cost over the term: ~$300M (minimum demand) to ~$770M (full demand) · rates, minimum demand ('80%' in AES's release) and exit fee confidential
- When
- May 6 2025 (HEA 1007 in effect) → Sep 29 2025 (Phase 1 CSA dated) → Oct 7 2025 (AES's president tells its rate case 'The Company does not currently have any data center customers') → Oct 17 2025 (IBJ: AES's MISO filings show a 1,200 MW substation for the site) → Oct 21 2025 (Google confirmed as the developer) → Dec 29 2025 (Phase 1 ESA dated; signed Dec 30) → Feb 27 2026 (pre-filing meeting with the IEDC, OED, OUCC, MISO and the customer) → Mar 2 2026 (IPALCO's 10-K: a 15-year agreement, customer unnamed) → Apr 22 2026 (petition, Cause No. 46394) → Apr 23 2026 (AES's release names Google) → May 6 2026 (amended petition) → Jun 17 2026 (OUCC, CAC and Industrial Group testimony) → Jul 17 2026 (AES's rebuttal) → Aug 5 2026 (evidentiary hearing) → Sep 2 2026 (AES's rate case reopened for evidence on the project) → Oct 3 2026 (the statute's deadline) → Oct 7 2026 (approved) → Mar 11 2027 (rate-case hearing) → summer 2028 (the load's capacity need begins) → May 31 2028 to March 2029 (the resources' targeted service dates) → fall 2028 (transmission construction to begin) → 2028–2042 (the 15 years of AES's bill-credit estimate) → 2029 (AES's next base rate case to be filed) → fall 2029 (the line and Blue Bluff substation in service) → end of 2029 (390 MW of new load)
- Status
- approved Oct 7 2026 by all five commissioners (Cause No. 46394), the date AES had agreed to, four days past the statute's 150-day deadline of Oct 3; nothing on file shows a rehearing petition or appeal (WTHR, Oct 13: still within the appeal window). The resources are targeted for service from mid-2028 to March 2029 (contested in-service), the Morgan County line and Blue Bluff substation for fall 2029, the full 390 MW by the end of 2029; AES's next base rate case, expected to be filed in 2029, re-allocates the costs on Google's actual load. AES's own 2026 base rate case was reopened on Sep 2 2026 for new evidence on this project; hearing from Mar 11 2027 (rate-case)
- Structure
- three customer-specific agreements approved together under Ind. Code §§ 8-1-2-24 and -25, between Indianapolis Power & Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana and a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. — a Construction Service Agreement (CSA: AES builds the transmission to serve the load; the customer pays the direct-connection costs up front and gives credit support), an Electric Service Agreement (ESA: 15 years, then until either party gives written notice, per CAC; the ramp, rates by calendar year in a $/kW-month demand charge and a $/MWh energy charge, a minimum demand charge, an exit fee) and a Temporary Service Agreement (TSA: about a year at Rate HL before the ESA) — which AES calls a Customer Specific Contract; and the 'project to serve a large load customer' under Ind. Code ch. 8-1-7.9 (HEA 1007) that they pay for, the Monrovia Project: three battery and solar resources, each to be owned by a project company held by a joint venture of an AES Indiana subsidiary (its managing member) and one or more tax-equity partners, selling into MISO at a price fixed by a contract for differences with AES Indiana, and AES-owned network upgrades. Google's revenue offsets the project's costs in AES's riders, and what it brings in above them is credited to other customers through the ECR rider
- Programme
- Time-to-power
- Parties
- Google customer — 'a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.' in the filings ('Google' in AES Indiana's releases), which is developing the Monrovia data center campus and takes service at transmission voltage; pays the direct-connection costs up front, gives credit support, and pays the ESA's demand and energy charges, and an exit fee if it leaves early · AES Indiana utility — Indianapolis Power & Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana; serves the load from its whole system, acquires or builds the three resources through tax-equity joint ventures that its subsidiary manages, builds and owns the network upgrades, and credits Google's revenue against the project's costs and its other customers' riders
- Record
- disclosed / primary source · as of Nov 2026
Flows 2 as the record states them
- AES Indiana → Googlepowerelectric service at transmission voltage to the Monrovia data center: 390 MW of new load by the end of 2029, ramping under the 15-year ESA after about a year of temporary service under Rate HL; served from AES Indiana's system as a whole ('slice of system'), to which it adds 460 MW of four-hour batteries and 130 MW of solar (Foundry Works, Hardy Hills, Crosstrack) and new 345 kV lines and substations
- Google → AES Indianapower-paymentsmonthly demand charges ($/kW-month) and energy charges ($/MWh) set by calendar year — confidential — with a minimum demand charge (an '80% minimum demand obligation' in AES's release), designed to recover at least 100% of the project's yearly generation and transmission costs even at the minimum and, by AES's model, about $300M (minimum demand) to $770M (full demand) above incremental costs over the term; the $32.3M direct-connection costs, up front during construction; the actual cost of the temporary service line; an exit fee on early termination; credit support
Resolved figures 18 each with the verbatim line from its document
- announcedfirst disclosed, without the customer's name, in IPALCO's 10-K for 2025, dated Mar 2 2026 — an agreement 'for a new data center campus to be located within the Company's service territory', with a filing under HEA 1007 to follow in the second quarter. It is the earliest disclosure on file; The AES Corporation's own 10-K for 2025, which is not on file, may have described it as early. Named on Apr 22–23 2026: AES Indiana's verified petition to the IURC (Cause No. 46394) seeks approval of a project 'required primarily to serve a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.', and its release the next day names Google and quotes Google's Will Conkling: 'This filing represents a landmark model for how data centers and utilities can partner to drive economic development while strictly protecting ratepayers.' The campus was public before the contract: in Oct 2025 IBJ reported AES's MISO filings for a substation on the rezoned site, and Google was confirmed as the developer on Oct 21 2025 (FOX59, as CAC's testimony cites it)
“In December 2025, AES Indiana executed a 15-year agreement to provide high-voltage retail electric service sufficient to accommodate the anticipated demand for a new data center campus to be located within the Company's service territory.”
IPALCO 10-K for 2025 (Mar 2 2026) — 'U.S. Utilities Load Growth and Large Load Customers' · sec.gov - partiesthe paper: three customer-specific agreements between Indianapolis Power & Light Company d/b/a AES Indiana and 'a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.' — unnamed in the filings, Google in AES Indiana's releases — which is developing the Monrovia campus: a Construction Service Agreement (AES engineers, procures and builds the transmission to serve the load on the load's schedule; Google pays the direct-connection costs up front and gives credit support), an Electric Service Agreement (the ramp from first service to full operations, the rates by calendar year, a minimum demand charge and an exit fee) and a Temporary Service Agreement (service at transmission level under Rate HL for about a year before the ESA starts). AES calls the arrangement a Customer Specific Contract (CSC). Dates: 'The Phase 1 CSA is dated September 29, 2025' and 'the Phase 1 ESA is dated December 29, 2025', its signature blocks reading '12/30/2025' (CAC's Inskeep, citing the agreements); IPALCO's 10-K: 'In December 2025'; AES's Rogers puts both in September 2025. They went to the Commission with Garavaglia's testimony and a supporting letter from the customer. AES Indiana serves about 533,000 retail customers (the order)
“AES Indiana is proposing to acquire, through subsidiaries, two stand-alone battery energy storage system (“BESS”) resources and a hybrid solar plus storage resource (“Generation and BESS Resources” or “Resources”) primarily to provide the requisite incremental energy and capacity to serve a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc. (“Customer”) at its planned data center site in Monrovia, Indiana (“Monrovia Project” or “Project”) under the Electric Service Agreement (“ESA”) between AES Indiana and the Customer.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — ¶3, relief requested · web.archive.org - approvalapproved Oct 7 2026 by all five commissioners (Swinger, Bain, Deig, Jerrells and Ziegner), after an evidentiary hearing on Aug 5 in which the OUCC (the state's consumer counselor), CAC, the AES Indiana Industrial Group and a group of residents and property owners (of Morgan County, per WFYI) took part. The statute gave the Commission 150 days, to Oct 3; AES had agreed to Oct 7 to fit the Commission's conference schedule. The order approves the Monrovia Project and its estimated costs; the CSA, ESA and TSA; the three resources, with their purchase agreements, joint-venture and tax-equity structure and contracts for differences, as clean energy projects; the accounting and ratemaking, as an alternative regulatory plan; and the transmission's depreciation rates — and declines jurisdiction over the joint ventures and project companies. Commissioner Jerrells: 'Not only does this agreement satisfy the statutory requirement, it exceeds it substantially' (WFYI). Nothing on file shows a rehearing petition or appeal; WTHR reported on Oct 13 that the order was within its appeal window
“AES Indiana’s petition for approval of the Monrovia Project and associated relief is approved.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — ordering paragraph 1 · web.archive.org - statute80%the law the contract is written to: House Enrolled Act 1007 (2025), effective May 6 2025 and codified at Ind. Code ch. 8-1-7.9, lets a utility seek expedited approval of a project to serve a 'large load customer' — by the statute's definition, one adding demand above the lesser of 5% of the utility's average peak or 150 MW, planning to invest over $500M in the facility and to employ at least 50 full-time — provided the customer commits to financial assurances that include reimbursement of 'at least eighty percent (80%) of the project costs reasonably allocable' to it, whatever load it ends up taking, with an order due within 150 days. The order finds the customer qualifies and has committed; AES's Maguire: the arrangement 'will exceed the statutory 80% requirement by having 100% of the costs reasonably allocable to the customer recovered through the ESA'. WFYI: 'The Monrovia project is the first data center filed under the new law.' Not the '80% minimum demand obligation' of AES's release, a different measure (minimum-demand)
“The evidence also demonstrates that the Customer has committed to significant and meaningful financial assurances that: (1) include reimbursement by the large load customer of at least 80% of the project costs reasonably allocated to the Customer;”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — Section 22 findings · web.archive.org - load390 MW390 MW of new load — utility demand, not a count of chips: the resources are 'sufficient to provide 390 MW of new load by the end of 2029' (IPALCO's 10-Q); the order, from AES's Maguire: 'the portfolio proposed in this filing includes 390 MW of new load with 460 MW of new 4-hour storage by 2030, a ratio of 118%'; CAC: 'the Customer’s demand of 390 MW'. AES Indiana's data-centers page and releases give no megawatts. The ESA ramps the load from first service to full operations on a schedule the public copy redacts, after about a year of temporary service; for cost allocation AES assumes a load factor of about 90%. The new load creates a capacity need from MISO planning year 2028/2029, starting in summer 2028 (the petition). Whether the campus will grow past 390 MW is contested (campus-load); CAC dates the agreements as 'Phase 1'
“The petition includes AES Indiana's plan to serve this increasing demand through the acquisition and development of additional generation resources, including solar and energy storage projects, sufficient to provide 390 MW of new load by the end of 2029.”
IPALCO 10-Q for Q3 2026 (Nov 3 2026) — Note 2, 'HEA 1007 - Large Load Customer Project Filing' · sec.gov - term1515 years: 'In December 2025, AES Indiana executed a 15-year agreement to provide high-voltage retail electric service' (IPALCO's 10-K, which does not name the customer; the Phase 1 ESA with the Alphabet subsidiary is the one dated in December 2025 — parties); AES Indiana's page, which names Google, gives the term as a floor: 'a long-term agreement (at a minimum of 15 years)' and 'totaling at least 15 years'; WFYI: 'The contract with Google lasts at least 15 years, according to AES'. AES's estimate of its customers' bill credits runs the 15 years 2028–2042 (Rogers, Table CAR-1). After that, by CAC's reading of the confidential agreement, 'The ESA provides that it shall continue unless and until terminated by either Party by providing advanced written notice' — hence 'at least'. The public copies give no start or end date. The resources' estimated useful life is about 25 years (Rogers), and the Commission saw no need for a different termination notice because AES needs their capacity after the ESA anyway, from the winter of 2037/38 (exit)
“In December 2025, AES Indiana executed a 15-year agreement to provide high-voltage retail electric service sufficient to accommodate the anticipated demand for a new data center campus to be located within the Company's service territory.”
IPALCO 10-K for 2025 (Mar 2 2026) — 'U.S. Utilities Load Growth and Large Load Customers' · sec.gov - project-cost$737.3M$737.3M, AES's estimate, 'net of Tax Equity Contribution': $641.4M for the three battery and solar resources (their interconnection included), $73.8M of transmission infrastructure and $22.1M of planning and post-order development costs ($7.8M + $14.3M, Rogers). The order describes 'the overall estimated Project Cost of $737.3 million, including the estimated tax equity contribution' — wording the petition's 'net of' does not match (contested infrastructure-size) — and finds it reasonable: 'no party directly challenged the reasonableness of the Project Cost estimates'. No cap (cost-overruns). AES's '$1.3 billion' is not this figure (infrastructure-size), and Google's $32.3M direct connection sits outside it, by inference (direct-connection). WFYI: 'The total project cost is $737.3 million'
“the total project cost estimate of the Monrovia Project (net of Tax Equity Contribution) is $737.3 million, broken down as follows:”
AES Indiana verified petition, Cause No. 46394 (Apr 22 2026) — ¶14, Table 1 · iurc.portal.in.gov - resources460 MWthe generation behind the load, picked through an all-source RFP: Foundry Works, a 200 MW battery on 42.5 acres in Lake County, and Crosstrack, a 130 MW solar farm with a 130 MW battery in Pike County, both being acquired from Invenergy under membership interest purchase agreements; and a 130 MW battery AES builds at its Hardy Hills solar site in Clinton County (expandable to 195 MW) — 460 MW of four-hour storage and 130 MW of solar, $641.4M net of tax equity, each designed for a 40% investment tax credit. Each is to be owned by a project company held by a joint venture of an AES Indiana subsidiary (its managing member) and tax-equity partners; the project company sells into MISO at a price 'effectively ... fixed' by a contract for differences with AES Indiana, and AES carries its investment as regulatory assets, offset by Google's revenue. Not Google's alone: AES serves Google 'with its system as a whole' under a 'slice of system' approach, and says it would need the capacity anyway from the winter of 2037/38. Against the 390 MW load the storage is 'a ratio of 118%' (the order). Self-generation was discussed: Google's parent 'has expressed an interest in developing new generation resources', but none were 'considered practical to integrate into the facility at this time' (the order). Their energy ratings and target dates differ across documents (contested storage-energy, in-service)
“the Generation and BESS Resources will add 460 MW of dispatchable 4-hour storage resources by 2030.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — Section 23(b)(1)(F) · web.archive.org - transmissionthe wires: about 10 miles of new 345 kV line from a future Antioch substation near Monrovia to a future Blue Bluff substation near AES's Eagle Valley Generating Station, on Route A, AES's preferred route; the order adds a STATCOM for reactive power at the new Antioch switchyard and an advanced conductor on the double-circuit 345 kV lines between Blue Bluff and Antioch. Construction is anticipated from fall 2028, the line and Blue Bluff in service in fall 2029 (contested transmission-timing). The petition splits the transmission into the resources' interconnections (inside their cost estimates), the 345 kV direct connection Google pays for (direct-connection) and the network upgrades (network-upgrades); CAC's testimony pictures the network upgrades with AES's map of this line. AES's page: 'the Morgan County project is not a dedicated connection serving a single customer'; CAC's Inskeep, citing AES's own MISO Expedited Project Review form, says the projects are 'expressly designed to specifically meet the needs of a single large load customer'; the order finds them needed both to serve the customer and for load growth around Monrovia
“The approximately 10-mile, 345-kV transmission line will connect the future Antioch Substation near Monrovia to the future Blue Bluff Substation near AES Indiana’s Eagle Valley Generating Station.”
AES Indiana, Morgan County Transmission Line Upgrade page (read Nov 2026) · aesindiana.com - annual-cost-recovery100%what 'Google pays 100%' means in the order: the ESA's rates rest on a modified 'slice of system' cost of service — Google's allocated share of AES's whole system, floored at the direct incremental cost of serving it where that is higher — so that Google's revenue reimburses 'at least 100% of the Project’s annual costs (both transmission and generation), even at the Customer’s minimum monthly demand'; at its expected demand it pays 'significantly more than the incremental fixed cost in every year of the ESA'. The OUCC did not oppose the plan on that representation. Google's revenue offsets the project's costs in AES's riders; a shortfall is deferred, with carrying charges, until ESA revenue covers it. The rates are set by calendar year as a demand charge ($/kW-month) and an energy charge ($/MWh), both confidential, and the ESA lets AES update them to actual costs (cost-overruns)
“the ESA rates were designed to ensure the revenues received from Customer will be sufficient to reimburse at least 100% of the Project’s annual costs (both transmission and generation), even at the Customer’s minimum monthly demand.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — customer agreements · web.archive.org - minimum-demand80%an '80% minimum demand obligation', in AES's Oct 7 release: Google 'will pay for costs to serve its facilities at that level even if actual energy usage is lower than projected', and its rates 'cover 100% of the annual costs to serve them at this 80% minimum demand obligation level'. The filings confirm a minimum demand charge — Rimal's rates carry 'a minimum demand charge provision that ensures the incremental costs of serving the Customer are recovered even at the minimum demand level' (the order) — but their public copies give no level, and the 80% is in no filing on file. Not the statute's 80% (statute)
“Google has committed to an 80% minimum demand obligation, meaning it will pay for costs to serve its facilities at that level even if actual energy usage is lower than projected.”
AES Indiana release (Oct 7 2026) · aesindiana.com - network-upgrades$73.8M$73.8M of network upgrades — the petition's 'Transmission Infrastructure' line in the $737.3M — which, unlike the direct connection, AES does not charge to Google directly: 'The Network Upgrades reflect investments that will benefit all of AES Indiana’s existing and future customers and are proposed to be included in AES Indiana’s transmission rate base and recovered through future rates' (the petition). The order agrees — they are 'treated as overall transmission assets serving all customers', and 'Just as the Customer will be allocated a portion of the existing network transmission infrastructure, it is reasonable for existing customers to also be allocated a portion of the network upgrades' — and rejects CAC's requests to assign 100% to Google, to depreciate them over the ESA's term, or to charge Google their undepreciated balance if it leaves. What Google's rates do cover is their yearly cost during the ESA: rates 'sufficient to reimburse at least 100% of the annual revenue requirement associated with the network upgrade transmission investments'. A Class 4 estimate (the order); the allocation is revisited in AES's next base rate case, expected to be filed in 2029. Who ends up paying is contested (who-pays-upgrades), and so is the estimate's history (network-upgrade-estimate)
“As part of the Monrovia Project, AES Indiana is proposing $73.8 million in Network Upgrade costs that are caused by and necessary for serving the Customer.”
CAC public testimony (Inskeep), Cause No. 46394 (Jun 17 2026) · iurc.portal.in.gov - direct-connection$32.3Mthe 345 kV facilities that connect Google's site to AES's system: Google pays 100% of their cost — expected to total $32.3M (CAC's Inskeep, citing Garavaglia; WFYI reports the same from his testimony) — up front, during construction, 'regardless of whether the Customer ultimately takes service for the anticipated amount and within the anticipated time frame' (the order, on the CSA), with 'adequate credit support'. Outside the $737.3M project cost by inference: the petition's $73.8M transmission item equals the network upgrades alone (CAC; WFYI); no filing says so directly. Under the TSA Google also pays the actual cost of building and removing a temporary service line
“AES Indiana is correctly ensuring the Customer is responsible for 100% of the Direct Connect costs expected to total $32.3 million and will pay AES Indiana upfront for those costs”
CAC public testimony (Inskeep), Cause No. 46394 (Jun 17 2026) · iurc.portal.in.gov - fixed-cost-contribution$770MAES's own estimate of what Google's payments bring in above the cost of serving it, over the ESA's term: about $770M at Google's full forecasted demand and about $300M at its minimum demand (Maguire and Rimal; the model is confidential). AES proposes to credit it to its other customers through its ECR rider, which Rogers estimates at $1.22 to $6.38 a month for a home using 1,000 kWh over 2028–2042 (Table CAR-1) — AES's estimate too. The order recites both figures through AES's witnesses ('more than $300 million toward fixed costs at minimum demand and over $770 million in revenue toward existing system costs at the Customer’s full forecasted demand') and finds that the ESA's rates make other customers' cost of service 'lower than it otherwise would have been without the Customer', putting no figure of its own on it. What to call it is contested (customer-savings)
“As explained by AES Indiana witness Maguire, even at the Customer’s minimum demand, the Company estimates the ESA provides approximately $300 million in contribution to existing system fixed costs through the end of the ESA term. At the Customer’s full forecasted demand, the ESA provides approximately $770 million in revenue in excess of incremental costs.”
AES Indiana verified petition, Cause No. 46394 (Apr 22 2026) — ¶24 · iurc.portal.in.gov - exitleaving early: under the ESA's Section 9 Google 'cannot give notice of early termination until a specified point in time', and must then give advance written notice and pay an Exit Fee — amount, formula and that point in time confidential. With AES's 'express commitments to prevent these contractual events from adversely impacting its customers', the Commission found the ESA 'reasonably safeguards other customers from the possibility of cost overruns in the early termination scenario'. Leaving later: the ESA runs on after its term until either side gives written notice (term), and CAC asked for a set notice period and a termination fee of a year's demand charges at maximum contract demand — proposals AES's Maguire said are 'not addressed to the term of the ESA, but to matters beyond this period' — and for charging Google the network upgrades' undepreciated balance whenever it leaves; the Commission declined both, noting that AES needs the capacity after the ESA anyway. CAC's public testimony also raises the ESA's 'renewal terms and Guaranty structure', its substance redacted. The CSA requires 'adequate credit support'; AES's page: 'Google must provide financial guarantees upfront' and its 'exit provisions ensure that any stranded costs remain with Google'
“This language shows that the Customer cannot give notice of early termination until a specified point in time, and if the Customer seeks to terminate the agreement, the Customer must provide advance written notice and pay an Exit Fee.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — customer agreements · web.archive.org - cost-overrunsno cap: the ESA lets AES update Google's rates to actual costs, 'including costs in excess of the estimates presented in this proceeding', so overruns pass to Google's rates, reviewed in later rider filings and rate cases. The Industrial Group asked for a cost cap; the Commission declined, citing force majeure, site conditions, supply chains and changes in law or regulation, tax law included, that AES may not control. AES is to report the final project cost once actual costs are known
“The ESA allows Petitioner to update the Customer’s rate to reflect actual costs, including costs in excess of the estimates presented in this proceeding.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — IG recommendations · web.archive.org - confidentialwhat is not public: the ESA's rates and ramp, the minimum demand level, the exit fee and when notice may be given, the TSA's megawatts and start date, and AES's revenue model — filed under seal, which the order upholds as trade secrets. CAC asked that more be made public; the Commission, the OUCC, the Industrial Group and CAC all had the unredacted versions. AES's spokesperson: 'The terms and details of the customer protection provisions and customer benefits have not been redacted' (WFYI); WFYI: the agreements 'include many redactions, including dollar amounts, rate schedules and timelines'
“we find AES Indiana provided sufficient evidence showing the information is trade secret information as defined in Ind. Code § 24-2-3-2, is exempt from public access and disclosure pursuant to Ind. Code §§ 5-14-3-4 and 8-1-2-29, and shall be held as confidential and protected from public access and disclosure by the Commission.”
IURC order, Cause No. 46394 (Oct 7 2026) — confidentiality findings · web.archive.org - rate-caseAES Indiana's own rate case was reopened over this deal. CAC's Inskeep told the Commission that AES had denied in that case that a data-center contract existed — its president testified on Oct 7 2025 that 'The Company does not currently have any data center customers', eight days after the CSA's date — and the order records his charge of AES's 'lack of candor'; AES's Rogers answered that it had said it would bring any large-load agreement to the Commission, as it did. On Sep 2 2026 the Commission granted the OUCC's request to reconsider the Jun 17 2026 base rate order and CAC's to reopen its record for new evidence on the Google project and the AES merger; hearing from Mar 11 2027, the new rates subject to refund meanwhile (IPALCO's 10-Q). WFYI: 'The review will continue into 2027.'
“the CAC's request to reopen the record for the limited capacity of gathering any new evidence applicable to the rate case concerning the Google Monrovia data center project and the pending AES Merger”
IPALCO 10-Q for Q3 2026 (Nov 3 2026) — Note 2, regulatory matters · sec.gov
Contested figures 26 not reconciled — every position side by side, with its source and tier
Scope note what this record leaves to other records
Not this record: the campus itself — Google's Monrovia data center in Morgan County, its acreage, buildings, jobs, water use, land purchases, county agreements and abatements and the state's incentives, which press reports on file describe (IBJ, IDS, WRTV, Inside INdiana Business, Compute Atlas) but which are not terms between AES Indiana and Google; Google's company-wide pledge of Mar 4 2026 to pay '100% of the power our data centers use and any new infrastructure costs directly driven by our growth', which names no project; AES Indiana's company-wide plans — its 2025 resource plan beyond the gas in supply-mix, its RFPs, its capital plan and its tax-equity history — and its base rate case except where the Commission reopened it over this project (rate-case); The AES Corporation's pending merger (on the aesindiana entity). Not adopted: WFYI's photo caption has the project's solar, batteries and lines 'will produce at least 390 megawatts of electricity' — a load read as generation; IBJ and IDS set the 1,200 MW substation's year at 90% against residential use in 'megawatts' (IBJ: residential use 'was 5.01 million megawatts'; IDS: '9.46 million megawatts of power a year') — energy, in MWh (1,200 MW × 8,760 hours × 90% ≈ 9.46 million MWh, our arithmetic), and a hypothetical on a substation's capacity, not a load forecast; Compute Atlas's 'no cited source states a planned data center capacity' and '390 appears only as an acreage', on a page last updated Nov 4 2026 that still says 'IURC order expected Sept 2026'; New Project Media's '170 MW Hardy Hills project in Dubois County' and 'Pine County' for Crosstrack, against its own '130 MW Hardy Hills' and every filing's 130 MW in Clinton County and Pike County; interconnection.fyi's '250+ MW', with no basis shown; IPM's report (Jul 14 2026) that the IURC 'approved a 130-megawatt battery energy storage facility in Pike County last week' — Crosstrack's battery in a proceeding of its own (the petition cites a pending Cause No. 46365 for Crosstrack Energy Storage, LLC), not this order.