US government–MP Materials

The Pentagon paid $400M for MP Materials preferred stock and lent it $150M. It backs a new Texas magnet plant for ten years and tops up a magnet material's price to $110 a kilogram through 2035.

A deal between US government, MP Materials

Why it matters

MP Materials says its new Texas plant's magnets underpin AI data centers, among other uses. The US Defense Department must buy every magnet the plant makes except what it asks or allows MP Materials to sell elsewhere. The Defense Department's long-term price-floor and magnet-purchase contracts with MP Materials said appropriated funds beyond fiscal 2025 were unavailable at signing.

Tap a figure for the line in its source.

US government gives MP Materials

  • cash for 400,000 shares of new preferred stock, whose 7% yearly dividend is added to their value rather than paid in cash
  • loan for 12 years at a fixed 5.38%, made in August 2025 to add samarium separation at the Mountain Pass mine
  • floor under the NdPr in MP's products from October 2025 to December 2035: each quarter the government pays the shortfall below $110
  • a year of guaranteed EBITDA for 10X once at full capacity, rising 2% a year from 2026, paid as quarterly 'magnet facilitation payments'

MP Materials gives US government

  • of common stock the preferred converts into, at $30.03 a share, MP's last sale price before signing
  • a ten-year to buy them at the same $30.03
  • disputedof MP's common stock, both converted and exercised: 15% of the share count before the deal, about 12–13% with the new shares counted in (12.2% in MP's resale prospectus, after its July 2025 offering); none held as common stock through September 2026
  • of the amount by which its NdPr price exceeds $110, but only once the new 10X magnet plant reaches full capacity
  • every magnet 10X makes, for ten years from its start, at production cost — unless the government asks or lets MP sell them to other buyers
  • of 10X's yearly EBITDA above the guarantee — the first $30M, then half the rest — in years after 10X reaches full capacity that MP sells magnets to other buyers
  • of its own cash for 10X, samarium separation, restarting its chlor-alkali plant and expanding its Fort Worth magnet plant to 3,000 t a year; it also agreed to stop selling under its with China's Shenghe

Jul 10, 2025 announced by MP Materialsupdated Nov 21, 2026closed Jul 10–11 2025 disclosed by the parties

What happened

In July 2025, the US Defense Department signed several linked contracts with MP Materials, which runs the only large rare-earth mine in the US. The department paid $400M for preferred stock, a type of share that generally takes priority over common stock for dividends. The department also received a , or a right to buy shares. Converting the preferred stock and exercising the warrant would yield shares equal to 15% of MP's pre-deal share count. The department also lent MP $150M. Since October 2025, the department has owed MP the difference whenever the quarterly average price of the NdPr MP produces falls below $110 a kilogram. NdPr is a mix of rare earths used to make magnets. MP recorded $51.0M for the price floor's first quarter, the last of 2025. It recorded $68.0M for the first nine months of 2026. In return, MP is building a second magnet plant in Northlake, Texas. The department must buy all the plant's output for ten years from opening, except what it asks or allows MP to sell to others. Once the plant reaches full capacity, the contract guarantees at least $140M a year in EBITDA. The measure is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, as defined in the contract. MP had stopped shipping concentrate, a material processed from ore, to China in April. It ended all sales there, citing the deal and its domestic supply-chain goals. The department still holds no common stock. Its contracts say the money for long-term payments had yet to be appropriated at signing, meaning it had yet to be authorized for spending. Whether the law allows the department to own shares is disputed.

Sources 46 documents — 19 SEC filings · 6 transcripts · 6 research notes · 6 press reports · 4 government statements · 3 company releases · 1 other document · 1 law-firm note

Research trail Found 153 documents and read 134 of them while checking this deal and related ones.

  1. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States 15 figures: $400M preferred · conversion shares · 15% stake as announced · 30% upside share · $51M PPA income 2025 · $550M cash consideration · $218.6M price protection rights · offtake · offtake lease · $140M yearly EBITDA floor · $30M EBITDA upside first tranche · $30M yearly cost reimbursement cap · $600M own cash ceiling · at least $1B bank commitment · NdPr run rate
  2. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States 10 figures: warrant · preferred outstanding · $150M loan · floor term · $68M PPA income 9m 2026 · 10X capacity · 10X commissioning · $80M 10X site · project swarm · china exit
  3. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States 5 figures: signing · 7% preferred dividend · 19.9% ownership cap · governance · $110 floor vs benchmark per kg
  4. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States 2 figures: $30.03 conversion price · $57 realized price per kg Q2 2025
  5. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States 2 figures: $110 price floor per kg · appropriations
  6. US Department of Defense · government statement (archived copy)defense.gov
    States $150M loan lender
  7. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States target capacity
  8. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States $1.25B 10X cost
  9. MP Materials · SEC filingsec.gov
    States at least $350M funding requirement
  10. MP Materials · company releasempmaterials.com
    States compute link
  11. GovInfo · government statementgovinfo.gov
    States dpa expiry (for context)
  12. Stock Analysis · transcriptstockanalysis.com
    States hdd demand
  13. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  14. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  15. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  16. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  17. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  18. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  19. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  20. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  21. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  22. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  23. SEC filingsec.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  24. company releaseJul 2025apple.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  25. company releases25.q4cdn.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  26. transcriptstockanalysis.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  27. transcriptstockanalysis.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  28. transcriptstockanalysis.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  29. transcriptstockanalysis.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  30. government statementNov 19, 2025congress.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  31. research notefas.org
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  32. research noteadamasintel.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  33. research noteApr 2026ceepr.mit.edu
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  34. press reportargusmedia.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  35. press reportnbcnewyork.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  36. other documentjpmorgan.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  37. press report (archived copy)investing.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  38. research noterusi.org
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  39. law-firm notehoganlovells.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  40. press reportfoxbusiness.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  41. press reportsemafor.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  42. research notelawfaremedia.org
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  43. transcriptarmed-services.senate.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  44. press reportkitco.com
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  45. government statementJan 2026whitehouse.gov
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.
  46. research notec2es.org
    Cited by the record; no single figure is quoted from it.

The record's own summary of its sourcing: MP 8-K Items 1.01/2.03/3.02/3.03/5.03 + exhibits 3.1 and 10.1–10.7 (Jul 10 2025; the ex-99.1 release and ex-99.2 deck furnished under Item 7.01, the deck cited from MP's investor-site copy), Q2-2025, Q3-2025, Q1-2026, Q2-2026 and Q3-2026 10-Qs, FY2025 10-K + ex-96.1 technical report, 424B5 (Jul 2025), 424B7 (Aug 2025), 2026 proxy; DoD/OSC release (Aug 10 2025, Wayback); MP 10X site release (Feb 26 2026); MP calls and conference remarks (StockAnalysis transcripts); MP House testimony (Nov 19 2025); MP's 8-K on Apple (Jul 15 2025, Item 8.01) + Apple newsroom; FAS (Alice Wu, Jul 15 2025); Adamas Intelligence (Jul 14 2025); MIT CEEPR commentary (Deese, Khan and Reese, Apr 2026); Argus, CNBC and Reuters (Jul 10 2025); J.P. Morgan; RUSI commentary (Henry Sanderson, Aug 15 2025); Hogan Lovells; Fox Business; Semafor (Sep 21 2026); Lawfare (Benjamin Press, Sep 10 2026); SASC transcript (Feb 24 2026, read 2026-10); Q3 2026 update (2026-11); Kitco wire story (Feb 18 2026), OSTP '2025 Wins' (Jan 2026) and C2ES for the contested cells (2026-11); Public Law 119-103 (Sep 2 2026) for the Defense Production Act's expiry date · as of Nov 2026

The evidence 40 sourced figures · 8 disputes · 1 for context

The record's headline US government–MP Materials: $400M of preferred plus a , a $150M loan, a $110/kg NdPr price floor to 2035, and a 10-year of the 10X magnet plant with a $140M-a-year EBITDA floor

Size
$550M cash ($400M equity + $150M loan) · $110/kg NdPr floor · 10X offtake with a $140M/yr EBITDA floor
When
Jul 9 2025 signing → Jul 10–11 2025 closing; loan Aug 2025; floor Oct 1 2025 – Dec 31 2035, income recognized through Q3 2026; 10X site bought Apr 2026; offtake in force since signing, its purchases running to ten years after 10X's Commercial Operation Date, the day it can first make magnets (commissioning expected in 2028); warrant expires Jul 10 2035 by MP's filings (Jul 11 by the dates in the filed form); loan matures Aug 1 2037
Status
closed Jul 10–11 2025 (the filings differ) · loan funded Aug 2025 · floor in force since Oct 2025 ($51.0M Q4 2025, $42.3M Q1 2026, $17.6M Q2 2026, $8.1M Q3 2026 of income recognized; the first three paid in the quarter after, the fourth receivable at Sep 30 2026) · 10X: site bought Apr 2026, construction under way, commissioning expected in 2028 · preferred unconverted and warrant unexercised at Sep 30 2026 · $1B bank commitment expired undrawn Aug 26 2025
Structure
a public-private package signed Jul 9 2025: convertible preferred plus a warrant (the government as shareholder), an unsecured loan from the department's Office of Strategic Capital (lender), a ten-year NdPr price floor with a 30% upside share once 10X reaches full capacity (price-floor payer), and a ten-year cost-plus offtake of 10X's magnets with a guaranteed $140M a year of EBITDA once at full capacity and an EBITDA upside share (buyer of last resort); MP commits its reasonable best efforts to build 10X, add samarium separation (an obligation contingent on the loan, which was made), restart its chlor-alkali plant and expand Independence, with up to $600M of its own cash, and agrees to end its offtake sales to China's Shenghe, to sell no NdPr or magnets to 'Restricted Buyers' and to sell Independence's magnets only to US customers (it then ended all its China sales, having stopped shipping concentrate there in April); the department committed to the long-term payments in advance of any appropriation for them
Programme
MP Materials–DoD
Parties
US government shareholder (preferred + warrant, through the Department of Defense) + lender (its Office of Strategic Capital) + NdPr price-floor payer + buyer of last resort for 10X's magnets, with an EBITDA floor · MP Materials issuer + borrower + the NdPr producer the floor covers + builder and owner of 10X
Record
disclosed / primary source · as of Nov 2026

Flows 6 as the record states them

  • US government → MP Materialsequity$400.0M cash for 400,000 Series A convertible preferred (7% a year, paid in kind), with a ten-year warrant for 11,201,659 shares at $30.03 issued alongside, Jul 2025 — neither converted nor exercised at Sep 30 2026
  • US government → MP Materialsdebt$150.0M unsecured Samarium Project Loan from the Office of Strategic Capital, Aug 2025: 12 years to Aug 1 2037 at a fixed 5.38%
  • US government → MP Materialsprice-flooreach quarter, $110/kg less the benchmark price on the NdPr MP sells or stockpiles, Oct 1 2025 – Dec 31 2035: $51.0M of income for Q4 2025, $42.3M for Q1 2026, $17.6M for Q2 2026, $8.1M for Q3 2026
  • US government → MP Materialsmagnet-purchases10X's magnets at production cost plus quarterly payments of 25% of a $140M-a-year EBITDA floor that rises 2% a year from 2026 (pro-rated to capacity until full capacity), for ten years from the Commercial Operation Date; before then, up to $30M a year of 10X's incremental engineering and start-up costs, plus uncapped feedstock working capital under the Transaction Agreement
  • MP Materials → US governmentmagnetsevery magnet 10X makes that the government does not ask or let MP sell to others — about 7,000 t a year once built and scaled; commissioning expected in 2028
  • MP Materials → US governmentupside-sharefrom 10X's full capacity: 30% of the NdPr benchmark's excess over $110, and in years MP sells magnets to others the first $30M plus half the rest of 10X's EBITDA above the floor

Resolved figures 40 each with the verbatim line from its document

  • signing
    the agreements were signed on Jul 9 2025 and announced on Jul 10: a Transaction Agreement with the Department of Defense, signed with the preferred's subscription agreement, the magnet offtake and the price protection agreement (8-K exhibits 10.1, 10.2, 10.5, 10.6), the warrant, registration rights agreement and promissory note filed as forms (10.3, 10.4, 10.7); MP's 2026 proxy dates them Jul 10, the day it announced them. J.P. Morgan's Andrew Castaldo, whose bank was MP's financial adviser, puts the talks at 'a two-and-a-half-month process from the end of April to the announcement in early July'. The RUSI commentary's 'In June' matches no filing, which all put them in July 2025
    “On July 9, 2025 (the “Effective Date”), the Company entered into a Transaction Agreement (the “Transaction Agreement,” and the transactions contemplated thereby, the “Transactions”) with the Department of Defense.”
    MP 8-K Item 1.01 (Jul 10 2025) · sec.gov
  • preferred$400M
    $400.0M cash for 400,000 shares of new Series A Cumulative Perpetual Convertible Preferred Stock, $1,000 of stated value each (8-K); MIT CEEPR's '4,000 shares' is a typo against it. The deal also let MP sell the government up to $350M more of the same preferred toward a funding requirement that MP met with a stock offering instead (funding-requirement)
    “The Company issued 400,000 shares of newly designated Series A Cumulative Perpetual Convertible Preferred Stock, par value $0.0001 per share (the “Series A Preferred Stock”) to the DoW for cash consideration of $400.0 million.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • preferred-dividend7%
    7.0% a year, cumulative, compounding quarterly and paid only in kind: it is added to the stated value, which with the dividends added sets the holder's minimum liquidation preference (the 'Liquidation Floor'; in a liquidation the holder gets the greater of that and what its shares would have received as converted), and it does not change how many common shares the preferred converts into (Q3-2025 10-Q)
    “Shares of Series A Preferred Stock accrue cumulative dividends at a rate of 7.0% per year (the “Dividend Rate”), compounding quarterly and payable solely in-kind through an increase to the stated value of each share of Series A Preferred Stock (each such Dividend, a “PIK Dividend”).”
    MP 8-K Item 1.01 (Jul 10 2025) · sec.gov
  • conversion-price$30.03
    $30.03 a share is both the preferred's initial conversion price and the warrant's initial exercise price: MP's last sale price before the subscription agreement was signed, and consistent with the NYSE's 'Minimum Price' requirement (8-K), adjustable for stock splits and stock dividends. Hogan Lovells' '$30.031/share', which it gives for the warrant, matches the text of MP's launch deck as posted on its investor site, where the marker of footnote 1 ('MP Materials share price as of 7/9/25 close') runs into both prices: 'Fixed conversion at $30.031', 'Exercisable for 10-year period at $30.031'
    “The initial conversion and exercise price for the preferred shares and warrant is $30.03 per share.”
    MP Q2-2025 10-Q · sec.gov
  • conversion-shares13,320,013
    the preferred converts into 13,320,013 common shares: $400.0M of initial stated value ÷ $30.03, the PIK dividends left out (8-K), at the government's election from 45 days after closing ('subject to certain extensions', 8-K). After the fifth anniversary MP can force conversion if its stock closes above 150% of the conversion price on at least 20 trading days in any 30, subject to conditions (8-K)
    “At the election of the DoW, the Series A Preferred Stock is convertible at any time into 13,320,013 shares of our common stock at an initial conversion price of $30.03 per share, subject to customary anti-dilution adjustments.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • warrantup to 11,201,659
    a ten-year warrant for up to 11,201,659 shares at $30.03, issued Jul 10 2025 and expiring Jul 10 2035, exercisable in cash or net shares at the government's option; by Sep 30 2026 'no shares of common stock had been issued pursuant to the exercise of the Warrant' (Q3-2026 10-Q; the Q2 10-Q said the same of Jun 30). With the conversion shares it makes 24,521,672 shares, which MP registered for the government's resale in Aug 2025 (424B7)
    “On July 10, 2025, the Company issued a warrant (the “Warrant”) to the DoW, exercisable at any time, in whole or in part, in cash or in net share settlement at the DoW’s option, for a period of ten years prior to its expiration on July 10, 2035, for up to 11,201,659 shares of the Company’s common stock, at an initial exercise price of $30.03 per share.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • stake-as-announced15%
    MP's own measure, in the 8-K and the 10-K: the 24,521,672 conversion and warrant shares are 15% of the 163,477,816 shares outstanding before the deal (424B5), the new shares left out of the count (24,521,672 ÷ 163,477,816 = 15.0%, our division). On it rests the release's line that the government 'is positioned to become' MP's largest shareholder. A scenario, not a holding: on other share counts see contested ownership
    “In the aggregate, the common stock into which the Series A Preferred Stock is initially convertible and for which the Warrant is initially exercisable collectively represented 15% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Company’s common stock as of July 9, 2025, without giving effect to the issuance of such shares.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • ownership-cap19.9%
    a blocker, not the stake: no conversion or exercise may take a holder above 19.9% of the common stock, except around a change of control (the transaction agreement, subscription agreement, certificate of designations and warrant, per the 8-K). The government must also make 'commercially reasonable efforts' not to sell the resulting shares to anyone who would then hold more than 9.9%
    “the Company will not effect any conversion of Series A Preferred Stock or exercise of the Warrant to the extent the delivery of the underlying Common Stock would cause a holder’s beneficial ownership of Common Stock to exceed 19.9%.”
    MP 8-K Item 1.01 (Jul 10 2025) · sec.gov
  • governance
    a passive holder on paper: a standstill while it holds any of the securities, and any common shares it holds voted as the board recommends, except on votes that cut against the deal's contracts or its relationship with MP, or against the law. Consent rights run the other way: while it keeps more than 75% of its securities, or the floor or the offtake runs, or the loan is unpaid, MP needs the government's consent to, among other things, nominate non-US citizens to its board, sell itself or 15% or more of its voting stock outside permitted jurisdictions, sell any equity or material assets of 10X's project company, or knowingly issue more than 14.9% of its stock to holders outside permitted jurisdictions; and it may not sell NdPr or magnets to 'Restricted Buyers' (8-K)
    “So long as the Department of Defense holds any Series A Preferred Stock, Warrant or Common Stock, the Department of Defense will be subject to a customary standstill (in its capacity as an equity holder). The Department of Defense must vote any shares of Common Stock held by it in favor of the Company Board’s nominees and any proposals recommended by the Company Board so long as the Department of Defense holds any Common Stock, except with respect to any vote (i) regarding the Company or its subsidiaries taking actions in violation of any Transaction Document (as defined below), (ii) seeking to reject, disclaim, unwind, terminate or otherwise materially and adversely impact the Company’s or its subsidiaries’ relationship with the Department of Defense, (iii) which would materially and adversely impact the ability of the Company or any of its subsidiaries to comply with its obligations under any Transaction Document or (iv) which is inconsistent with applicable laws.”
    MP 8-K Item 1.01 (Jul 10 2025) · sec.gov
  • preferred-outstanding400,000
    still 400,000 shares outstanding at Sep 30 2026 — none converted and no further preferred sold — so the government held MP's preferred and its warrant but none of its common stock. The 7% dividend had raised the preferred's aggregate liquidation preference — its minimum, which the notes call the 'Liquidation Floor' — to $435,580 thousand, from $428,088 thousand at Jun 30 2026 (Q2-2026 10-Q) and $413,489 thousand at Dec 31 2025 (balance sheet)
    “Series A cumulative perpetual convertible preferred stock ($0.0001 par value, 400,000 shares authorized, issued and outstanding as of September 30, 2026, and December 31, 2025, respectively; aggregate liquidation preference of $435,580 and $413,489 as of September 30, 2026 and December 31, 2025, respectively)”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • loan$150M
    $150.0M unsecured promissory note, Aug 2025: 12 years to Aug 1 2037 at a fixed 5.38%, the 10-year Treasury rate plus 1.00% when funded, interest paid quarterly from Oct 15 2025 (Q3-2026 10-Q), prepayable at any time without penalty (10-K). It pays for adding samarium oxide separation to the heavy rare-earth refining at Mountain Pass — work MP had to do only if the loan was made (8-K). MP books it below face: see contested loan-subsidy
    “In August 2025, the Company issued a $150.0 million unsecured promissory note to the DoW with a 12-year term, maturing on August 1, 2037 (the “Samarium Project Loan”), which bears interest at a fixed rate of 5.38% per annum, calculated as the 10-year U.S. Treasury constant maturity rate plus 1.00% at the time of funding.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • loan-lender$150M
    the lender's own account, and the one Defense Department release on file for the deal (the agreements are filed only by MP): its Office of Strategic Capital calls the loan its 'first direct loan' and says the money came from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which gave OSC $500M of credit subsidy (release, Aug 10 2025). Semafor, paraphrasing a Pentagon spokesperson, reports OSC's role in the deal as limited to the $150M loan under its statute, the $400M equity having been made by the Pentagon's Acquisitions and Sustainment unit under the Defense Production Act (Sep 21 2026)
    “As part of a wider July 2025 agreement between DoD and MP Materials, owner and operator of a U.S. rare earths mine, OSC provided a $150 million loan to add heavy rare earth separation capabilities to MP Materials' existing processing facility in Mountain Pass, California.”
    DoD/OSC release (Aug 10 2025) · web.archive.org
  • price-floor-per-kg$110
    $110 a kilogram of NdPr — the PPA's 'Specified Per Kilogram Payment Amount', per NdPr kilogram equivalent — on the NdPr in MP's products (concentrate, oxide and metal), not on magnets: the magnets go to the government under the separate offtake, at production cost plus the guaranteed EBITDA. The RUSI commentary's 'price floor of $100 per kg' matches no filing, and Sen. Reed's account at the Feb 24 2026 SASC hearing — the department buying MP's magnets at $110 a kilogram for ten years from 2028 — runs the floor and the offtake together
    “$110 per NdPr Kilogram Equivalent included in the Sold NdPr Products.”
    Price Protection Agreement (8-K exhibit 10.6) · sec.gov
  • floor-vs-benchmark-per-kg$110
    how it pays: each quarter the government pays the shortfall between $110 and the PPA's 'Benchmark Quarterly Average Volume Weighted Price' on every kilogram of NdPr counted, within 30 days of MP's quarterly report (PPA §3(a)). That benchmark is the 'volume average realized sales price' of the NdPr counted (PPA §1), with each kind priced by the PPA's own rules (§2): stockpiled NdPr, and sales to MP's own magnet business, as if sold at the market price — the Asian Metal index for NdPr oxide in China, which the department may replace, with MP's consent, by an ex-China index once one exists (§1) — and sales to others at the greater of a redacted figure and the price actually paid (an in-house sale whose price an arm's-length contract with a third party sets counts at the greater of a redacted figure and that price). What counts is MP's election each quarter: NdPr sold to others, sold to its own magnet business, or produced and set aside as stockpile (10-K) — after MP first allocates its NdPr to its own magnet plants, and leaving out NdPr made from third-party feedstock bought above $110 a kilogram (§2). When the benchmark is above $110 the government pays nothing (and see upside-share)
    “Pursuant to the terms of the PPA, the Department of Defense will pay to the Company at the end of each quarter a quarterly payment per kilogram (kg) of Neodymium-Praseodymium (“NdPr”) produced by the Company equal to the shortfall between $110 per kg and the Benchmark Quarterly Average Volume Weighted Price (as defined in the PPA).”
    MP 8-K Item 1.01 (Jul 10 2025) · sec.gov
  • floor-term10
    Oct 1 2025 – Dec 31 2035: from the first full calendar quarter after closing to the end of the quarter holding the tenth anniversary of that start (PPA §6); the technical report filed with the 10-K gives the same dates
    “The PPA establishes a price floor for the Company’s NdPr products (e.g., concentrate, oxide and metal) (collectively, “NdPr Products”), which commenced on October 1, 2025 and will continue for approximately ten years through December 31, 2035.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • upside-share30%
    the floor's return leg: once 10X reaches full production capacity (the 'Production Milestone Date'), MP pays the government 30% of any excess of the benchmark over $110 — and nothing before that date, whatever the price: under the PPA the Company 'shall not be required to make any payment to DOD pursuant to this Section 3(b) until after the Production Milestone Date'. FAS (Jul 15 2025) states the 30% without the condition
    “Once the 10X Facility reaches full production capacity (the “Production Milestone Date”), and the Benchmark Quarterly Average Volume Weighted Price exceeds $110, we will pay the DoW 30% of the amount by which the Benchmark Quarterly Average Volume Weighted Price exceeds $110.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • ppa-income-2025$51M
    $51.0M for Q4 2025, the floor's first quarter and so all of 2025's, accrued as a receivable at year-end — 'primarily' for NdPr in stockpiled concentrate MP still held as inventory, plus NdPr it sold to others (10-K)
    “For the year ended December 31, 2025, the Company recognized $51.0 million in “Price protection agreement income” within the Company’s Consolidated Statements of Operations, and accrued this amount within the Consolidated Balance Sheets in “Other receivables.” The income pertains primarily to NdPr Product contained in stockpiled concentrate, which remains in “Inventories” within the Consolidated Balance Sheets, and third-party sales of NdPr Product.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • ppa-income-9m-2026$68M
    $8.1M for Q3 2026 and $68.0M for the nine months, $59.9M of it in the first half (Q2-2026 10-Q: $17.6M in Q2) and $42.3M of that in Q1 (Q1-2026 10-Q) — $119.0M of floor income from Oct 2025 to Sep 2026 (our sum, with Q4 2025's $51.0M); the Q4 2025, Q1 and Q2 amounts, $110.9M in all, were received from the DoW in the nine months (the Q2 amount after Jun 30, when it was still receivable), and Q3's $8.1M was still receivable at Sep 30 (Q3-2026 10-Q). Falling as the market rose toward $110 and the income shifted from stockpile to sales: Q4 2025's 'pertains primarily to NdPr Product contained in stockpiled concentrate' (10-K), while 'A substantial majority' of 2026's, in the quarter and the nine months alike, 'pertained to sales to third parties' (Q3-2026 10-Q); on the Aug 6 2026 call MP's CFO, Ryan Corbett, said that 'With market pricing hovering at about $110 per kg in the first part of Q3' he expected 'minimal PPA income' on stockpiled NdPr, and realized oxide prices 'in the high 90s per kg', leaving floor income of roughly $10 a kilogram on sales; on the May 7 2026 call he had named a second cause beside the price, less concentrate to stockpile: 'As concentrate production available for stockpiling continues to decline with the ongoing ramp-up of our midstream operations and with NdPr market prices remaining close to or above the $110 per kilogram floor, we do not expect to generate a material amount of PPA income from stockpiled concentrate in the coming quarters'
    “For the three and nine months ended September 30, 2026, the Company recognized $8.1 million and $68.0 million, respectively, in “Price protection agreement income” within the Company’s unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • cash-consideration$550M
    $550.0M of cash moved from the government to MP: $400.0M for the preferred (Jul 2025) and the $150.0M loan (Aug 2025) — the money the two ribbons draw. The warrant had no price of its own: the $400.0M is the preferred's purchase price (subscription agreement), and the Transaction Agreement issues the warrant in return for the department's commitment to buy more preferred had MP fallen short of its funding requirement and for its undertakings to help with federal permits and heavy rare-earth supply (§6.01(f)); MP's accounting nonetheless allocates the cash across all three instruments by relative fair value (price-protection-rights)
    “Total cash consideration was $550.0 million, consisting of $400.0 million from the issuance of the Series A Preferred Stock and $150.0 million from the issuance of the Samarium Project Loan.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • price-protection-rights$218.6M
    MP's own accounting of what the floor was worth to it at issuance: the preferred, warrant and loan it issued had a fair value of $768.6M (preferred $418.4M, warrant $264.2M, loan $86.0M) against $550.0M of cash, and MP booked the $218.6M difference as 'the value of the price protection rights' — the government paid for the securities partly in cash and partly by granting the floor. With $2.5M of costs it became a $221.1M asset, amortized to $176.8M by Sep 30 2026 (Q3-2026 10-Q: $221,102 thousand less $44,343 thousand of amortization; $187.5M at Jun 30)
    “The difference between the fair value of the Issued Instruments and the cash consideration received was $218.6 million, which represents the value of the price protection rights provided under the PPA.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • offtake10
    the government is to buy every magnet 10X makes — or, at its request or with its consent, MP sells up to all of them to other customers — at production cost plus the guaranteed EBITDA, for ten years from the Commercial Operation Date, when the plant can first produce any magnets (10-K). The seller is the plant's project company, MP 10X Development, LLC (8-K exhibit 10.5); its purchases cover 10X's magnets alone, not those of MP's Independence plant in Fort Worth, though the start-up cost reimbursement can include Independence's incremental costs of designing magnets to the department's specifications (offtake §6.4.1). MP's Q3-2026 10-Q repeats it as the department being 'obligated to purchase all of the magnets produced at the 10X Facility (which may instead be commercially syndicated with the DoW’s approval)'
    “We entered into a magnet offtake agreement with the DoW (the “DoW Offtake Agreement”), pursuant to which we will sell to the DoW the entire amount of magnets produced at the 10X Facility; provided, however, that at the DoW’s request, or at our request and with the DoW’s consent, we may sell up to 100% of magnet production to other third party customers. The DoW will acquire the magnets at a price equal to their production costs (as defined in the DoW Offtake Agreement), plus the guaranteed EBITDA discussed below. The DoW Offtake Agreement’s term will continue through 10 years from the date at which the 10X Facility begins operations and is capable of producing any quantity of magnets (the “Commercial Operation Date”).”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • offtake-lease
    MP's accounting finds a lease of 10X to the government inside the offtake, because the government gets substantially all of the plant's economic benefits and directs its use (10-K) — while MP's Feb 2026 release stresses the plant stays 'wholly owned and operated by MP Materials'
    “Given the DoW’s right to substantially all of the economic benefits of the 10X Facility and its ability to direct the use of the 10X Facility, the DoW Offtake Agreement contains a lease for the 10X Facility.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • yearly-ebitda-floor$140M
    $140M of EBITDA a year guaranteed for 10X from the Production Milestone Date (full capacity), raised 2% for each calendar year after 2025, with a share pro-rated to demonstrated capacity between the Commercial Operation Date and full capacity. The government pays it as quarterly 'magnet facilitation payments' (the offtake's term, §6.2, which the 8-K uses too) of 25% of the year's threshold, trued up annually
    “In accordance with the DoW Offtake Agreement, the DoW guaranteed that the 10X Facility will generate at least $140 million of EBITDA (as defined in the DoW Offtake Agreement) on an annual basis after the Production Milestone Date, adjusted annually in each calendar year following 2025 for inflation at a rate equal to 2% (the “Threshold EBITDA Amount”). Between the Commercial Operation Date and the Production Milestone Date, we are entitled to a proportion of the Threshold EBITDA Amount based on demonstrated capacity levels. The DoW will make quarterly payments to us in an amount equal to 25% of the Threshold EBITDA Amount, subject to annual true-up.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • ebitda-upside-first-tranche$30M
    the offtake's return leg: from the Production Milestone Date, in any year MP sells magnets to other customers, the government takes the first $30M of 10X's EBITDA above the threshold and 50% of the rest. Not the same $30M as the yearly cap on reimbursed costs (yearly-cost-reimbursement-cap)
    “Commencing on the Production Milestone Date, if the Company sells magnets to third-party customers, the DoW will be entitled to receive for each calendar year (i) the first $30 million of EBITDA attributable to the 10X Facility that exceeds the Threshold EBITDA Amount (the “Initial Excess Amount”) and thereafter (ii) 50% of the EBITDA attributable to the 10X Facility that exceeds the Initial Excess Amount.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • yearly-cost-reimbursement-cap$30M
    before commercial operation the government reimburses certain incremental costs of 10X's engineering, development and start-up and of designing magnets to its specifications, where they cannot be capitalized, up to $30M a year (the offtake) — and, under the Transaction Agreement (§6.06(a)), the working capital for stockpiling or forward-buying heavy rare-earth feedstock, with no annual cap (10-K). MP showed $2.5M of such costs receivable at Sep 30 2026 ('DoW reimbursable costs receivable', $3.9M at Jun 30) and $7.9M of reimbursable amounts deferred as a contract liability, with the same $7.9M capitalized as costs to fulfill the contract (Q3-2026 10-Q, Notes 9 and 13)
    “Under the DoW Offtake Agreement, before the Commercial Operation Date, the Company is entitled to receive reimbursement from the DoW for certain incremental costs incurred by the Company in connection with engineering, development and start-up of the 10X Facility and for designing magnets to the DoW’s specifications (to the extent such costs are not capitalizable as 10X Facility construction costs), with such payments being capped at $30 million in any calendar year.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • 10x-capacity7,000
    about 7,000 t of finished magnets a year once 10X is built and scaled (10-K; the Q3-2026 10-Q repeats the sentence word for word). The 10,000 t in circulation is two other things: MP's company-wide total with Independence's 3,000 t (10-K, release, Q3-2026 10-Q), and the offtake's target of at least 10,000 t of magnet blocks, which the contract equates to at least 7,000 t finished (target-capacity)
    “The 10X Facility is expected to begin commissioning in 2028, and once completed and scaled, it will produce an estimated 7,000 MTs of magnets per year.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • target-capacity10,000
    the offtake's 'Target Capacity Amount', whose attainment marks the Production Milestone Date that starts the full EBITDA floor and both upside shares — the last day of the quarter in which MP's project company notifies the department that the plant can produce that amount in a year: at least 10,000 t a year measured as magnet blocks, at least 7,000 t of finished magnets, an amount the parties may update if the department's magnet specifications change (exhibit 10.5)
    “a target Magnet equivalent capacity of at least 10,000 tons (which, at a typical conversion rate from block to finished magnets, equates to at least 7,000 tons of finished magnets)”
    Offtake Agreement (8-K exhibit 10.5) · sec.gov
  • 10x-commissioning2028
    commissioning expected to begin in 2028 — the filings' year since the deal (release, 10-K, Q2-2026 and Q3-2026 10-Qs). Management's remarks put it between mid-year and year-end: 'by year-end 2028' on the deal call (Jul 10 2025), 'mid or end of 2028' (CFO, Apr 2026), initial capacity 'at the end of 2028' (Jun 2026). It is MP's expectation, not a date, and the contracts themselves call the timing uncertain — in the offtake, 'the estimated timeframe for completing the construction, development, commissioning, start-up and operation of the Commercial Plant is uncertain' (§12.18), and the Transaction Agreement says the same of 10X's construction (§6.04(d)). The technical report filed with the 10-K assumes full capacity on Jan 1 2030 'for economic modeling purposes'
    “The 10X Facility is expected to begin commissioning in 2028, and once completed and scaled, it will produce an estimated 7,000 MTs of magnets per year.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • 10x-cost$1.25B
    $1.25B — the Transaction Agreement's estimate of 10X's development, construction, commissioning and start-up cost, to be paid from MP's dedicated cash and/or the bank commitment (exhibit 10.1); MP's Q3-2026 10-Q still says 'We expect to invest more than $1.25 billion in this project, which is supported by approximately $200 million of state and local incentive packages' (its Q2 10-Q said the same). An estimate, not an audited total; the cost figures in the local tax-abatement filings and in the state's architectural-barriers registrations of two 10X buildings measure narrower scopes. None of them is the project total, and no audited total is on file
    “the estimated cost of development and construction, commissioning and start up of the 10X Facility is $1,250,000,000, which will be financed from a combination of dedicated cash of the Company”
    Transaction Agreement (8-K exhibit 10.1) · sec.gov
  • 10x-site$80M
    a 120-acre site in Northlake, Texas, bought in April 2026 for about $80M, with construction under way (Q3-2026 10-Q, which dates its start to spring 2026: 'which construction commenced in spring 2026'); MP announced the choice on Feb 26 2026
    “In April 2026, the Company purchased a 120‑acre site in Northlake, Texas, for approximately $80 million where construction of the 10X Facility is currently underway.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • project-swarm
    new in the Q3-2026 10-Q, under its 'Recent Developments': in July 2026 MP launched 'Project Swarm', through which U.S. and allied drone and motor manufacturers 'may reserve future magnet production capacity from the 10X Facility', 'intended to aggregate anticipated industry demand, accelerate standardization of magnet requirements and build a durable domestic supply chain'. The Q2 10-Q (Aug 7 2026) has no such passage. The same 10-Q describes the department as 'obligated to purchase all of the magnets produced at the 10X Facility (which may instead be commercially syndicated with the DoW’s approval)' (offtake); it gives no volume, price, buyer or term for any reservation and does not say whether the department has approved or been asked to approve one
    “In July 2026, we launched Project Swarm, an initiative through which U.S. and allied drone and motor manufacturers may reserve future magnet production capacity from the 10X Facility.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • own-cash-ceiling$600M
    MP's side of the bargain: reasonable best efforts to build 10X, add samarium oxide separation at Mountain Pass, restart its chlor-alkali plant and expand Independence to 3,000 t of magnets a year, using up to $600M of its existing cash (10-K) — and to end its buyback and its sales under the Shenghe offtake (8-K; china-exit)
    “On July 9, 2025, the Company entered into the DoW Transaction Agreements, whereby the Company agreed to use its reasonable best efforts to (i) construct the 10X Facility, which will produce sintered NdFeB permanent magnets, (ii) extend HREE refining capability at Mountain Pass to include the separation of samarium oxide, (iii) recommission the chlor-alkali facilities at Mountain Pass and (iv) expand capacity at the Independence Facility to a projected 3,000 MTs of magnets annually. The Company also agreed to use up to $600 million of its existing cash to fund these projects.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • bank-commitmentat least $1B
    JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs's commitment letter for at least $1B of secured financing for 10X ($650M of it earmarked for construction, 8-K) expired undrawn on Aug 26 2025, cut dollar for dollar by MP's July 2025 stock offering and its $275.0M revolving credit facility; MP expensed $7.4M of fees (10-K). The release's '$1.0 billion of financing' never funded
    “pursuant to which the Banks agreed to provide committed secured financing in an amount equal to, in the aggregate, at least $1 billion. The Commitment Letter expired undrawn on its own terms on August 26, 2025, as it was reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis upon the Offering (as defined in Note 18, “Stockholders’ Equity and Stock-Based Compensation”) and the Company’s execution of the Revolving Credit Facility (as defined in Note 10, “Debt Obligations”).”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • funding-requirementat least $350M
    the deal required MP to raise at least $350M of further net proceeds within 45 days of closing, from alternatives that included selling the government up to $350M more of the same preferred or drawing on the bank commitment (8-K). MP's July 2025 stock offering met it, with $724.2M of net proceeds (10-K), so the extra preferred was never sold (preferred-outstanding)
    “The Company is also required to select and fund from available alternatives within 45 days of the closing of the DoD Transactions at least $350 million of additional net proceeds, which would be satisfied by the net proceeds received from this offering.”
    MP 424B5 prospectus supplement (Jul 2025) · sec.gov
  • appropriations
    the money for the long-term payments had not been appropriated: both the PPA (§8(q)) and the offtake (§6.8.1) state that, except as the Transaction Agreement's §5.02(a) provides, 'appropriated funds are not presently available to fund' the department's obligations — §5.02(a) says funds were available for its spending in fiscal 2025, the preferred, any extra preferred up to the funding threshold, the loan and that year's payments under both contracts included. It pledges its reasonable best efforts to get the rest — budget requests, transfers of other funds, supplemental appropriations — and on the first day of each fiscal year, in October, must certify to MP that the year's funding is in place or give notice of 'any anticipated funding shortfall' (PPA §8(q)); and it says it confirmed with OMB's Office of the General Counsel that it may commit in advance of appropriations (§8(r)). MP's 8-K calls this funding 'contractually agreed to (but currently unavailable)'. Asked at a Senate hearing (Feb 24 2026) whether a deal relying on future appropriations complies with the Antideficiency Act, the assistant secretary of defense for industrial base policy said the department had 'submitted requests for funds to go ahead and pay the quarterly payments that we expect are necessary to meet our offtake agreements' (SASC transcript)
    “DOD has confirmed with the Office of Management and Budget Office of the General Counsel that DOD is authorized to incur obligations under this Agreement in advance of appropriations.”
    Price Protection Agreement (8-K exhibit 10.6); SASC transcript (Feb 24 2026) for the hearing answer · sec.gov
  • china-exit
    MP stopped selling to customers in China in July 2025 'to align with the terms of the DoW Transaction Agreements and in further support of its domestic supply chain objectives' and let its Shenghe offtake lapse in Jan 2026 (Q3-2026 10-Q, in the Q2's words); its revenue had historically come from selling rare-earth concentrate to customers in China (10-Q). It had already stopped shipping concentrate to China in April 2025, 'in response to China's retaliatory tariffs and export controls' (Q2-2025 10-Q), so July ended the sales that were left. What the agreements themselves require is narrower: an end to sales under the Shenghe offtake, which was not renewed (8-K; the Transaction Agreement has MP not renew it and ask Shenghe to end it by mutual agreement, §2.06(b)), no sales of NdPr or magnets to 'Restricted Buyers' (8-K), its Independence plant's magnets sold only to US customers (§6.05(e)) and, while the offtake runs, no heavy rare earths or their feedstock sold to others without the department's consent (§6.06(a))
    “In July 2025, to align with the terms of the DoW Transaction Agreements and in further support of its domestic supply chain objectives, the Company ceased all sales of its products to customers in China and did not extend the term of the Shenghe Offtake Agreement when it expired in January 2026.”
    MP Q3-2026 10-Q · sec.gov
  • realized-price-per-kg-q2-2025$57
    $57 a kilogram: MP's average realized NdPr price in Apr–Jun 2025, the quarter before signing ($52 in Jan–Mar) — so the $110 floor was nearly twice what MP was getting (our ratio). Reuters' '$52 per kilogram' for 'the second quarter' (Jul 10 2025) is the first quarter's figure
    “NdPr Realized Price per KG $ 57 $ 48 $ 9 19 % $ 54 $ 55 $ (1) (2) %”
    MP Q2-2025 10-Q · sec.gov
  • ndpr-run-rate6,075
    about 6,075 t of NdPr oxide a year at Mountain Pass's anticipated production rates (10-K) — the volume the floor would apply to at full output, and the volume in FAS's cost estimate (contested floor-cost). MP produced 2,599 t of NdPr in 2025 (10-K) and 2,775 t in the first nine months of 2026, 1,018 t of it in the third quarter (Q3-2026 10-Q; 1,757 t in the first half).
    “Upon reaching anticipated production rates for REO and other planned midstream products at Mountain Pass, we expect to produce approximately 20,000 MTs of separated REO per year, which includes approximately 6,075 MTs of NdPr oxide per year, excluding cerium concentrate.”
    MP 10-K FY2025 · sec.gov
  • compute-link
    MP's own tie to compute: its release naming Northlake as 10X's site says the plant's magnets 'underpin' technologies including AI data centers, beside drones, robotics, electrification and chipmaking. None of the deal's SEC filings names data centers; the 10-K's list of rare-earth end markets includes 'hard disk drives'
    “These magnets underpin technologies central to economic resilience and national security, including drones, robotics, AI data centers, electrification, and advanced semiconductor fabrication.”
    MP release (10X site, Feb 26 2026) · mpmaterials.com
  • hdd-demand
    MP's CFO, Ryan Corbett, at J.P. Morgan's natural resources conference (Jun 23 2026) — his 75%, with no source given. In April he had said 'Data centers need cooling' and that efficient HVAC systems carry magnets (a conversation with a Deutsche Bank analyst, Apr 1 2026), and on the Aug 6 2026 call MP's CEO, James Litinsky, named disk drives among the big magnet uses that need essentially no heavy rare earths
    “75% of memory that is going into AI data centers right now is hard disk drives. Hard disk drives are significant magnet consumers.”
    MP CFO at J.P. Morgan conference (Jun 23 2026) · stockanalysis.com

Contested figures 24 not reconciled — every position side by side, with its source and tier

ownership4 positions, side by side
15% — MP's measure (8-K, release, 10-K): 24,521,672 conversion and warrant shares ÷ the 163,477,816 shares outstanding before the deal (424B5), the new shares left out. The release's 'is positioned to become' the largest shareholder rests on it, as does MP's offering prospectus: 'On an as-converted and as-exercised basis, the Department of Defense became the Company's largest stockholder'; MP's CEO told CNBC the government was 'our economically largest shareholder', its CFO told J.P. Morgan's June conference 'The department is now our largest shareholder', and Sen. Reed called the US military 'one of that company's largest shareholders' (SASC, Feb 24 2026); the government's own account, the White House science office's year-one highlights (posted Jan 2026), says the deal made 'the Federal government the company’s largest shareholder at 15%' MP 8-K + release (Jul 10 2025) + 10-K; 424B5; CNBC; MP CFO at J.P. Morgan conference (Jun 23 2026); SASC transcript; OSTP '2025 Wins' (Jan 2026)
about 12–13% — the same shares, counted in the total: 'about 12 or 13% of the pro forma ownership of MP' (Andrew Castaldo of J.P. Morgan, MP's financial adviser, in an interview the bank publishes on two of its pages); 24,521,672 ÷ (163,477,816 + 24,521,672) ≈ 13.0% (our division) J.P. Morgan (Making Sense podcast)
12.2% — the SEC beneficial-ownership measure in MP's resale prospectus of Aug 15 2025: 24,521,672 shares ÷ 201,619,986, which counts them after MP's July 2025 stock offering MP 424B7 (Aug 15 2025)
none of the common stock held — through Sep 30 2026 the government had converted no preferred and exercised no warrant (Q3-2026 10-Q), and MP's 2026 proxy table of 5%-or-greater holders (percentages on the 178,018,991 shares outstanding at Apr 13 2026, the three institutions' holdings taken from their past ownership filings — for Vanguard not its most recent, which, a footnote says, reports its holding disaggregated after an internal reorganization) lists Hancock Prospecting 7.8%, Vanguard 7.7%, Litinsky 7.2% and BlackRock 6.7%, not the government, without saying why; as converted and exercised on that count ≈12.1% (our division), and ≈12.1% again on the 178,267,976 shares the Q3 10-Q's cover counts at Oct 30 2026 (our division) MP Q3-2026 10-Q + 2026 proxy
loan-subsidy2 positions, side by side
$64.0M — MP's accounting: the loan was booked at its $86.0M share of the instruments' fair value, a debt discount of $64.0M 'as the Samarium Project Loan bears interest at a rate lower than the market interest rate applicable to the Company', amortized at an effective 12.3% against the 5.38% coupon (10-K); carried at $88.0M at Sep 30 2026, $150.0M of principal less $62.0M of unamortized discount and issuance costs (Q3-2026 10-Q) MP 10-K FY2025 + Q3-2026 10-Q
$7M — MIT CEEPR's subsidy in the $150M loan, taken 'directly from the CIM database with no adjustments' on a cash-equivalent present-value basis (Apr 2026). The database counts a loan's subsidy as 'the portion of capital provided on below-market terms', from government sources or its own estimate; which one applies here, and the inputs, are not on file, so the documents do not establish which figure is 'the' subsidy MIT CEEPR commentary (Deese, Khan and Reese, Apr 2026)
floor-cost4 positions, side by side
~$300M a year — FAS (Jul 15 2025): '($110/kg - $60/kg) x 6,075,000 kg = $303.75 million', the floor's cost if the price sat at the $60/kg it called current and MP produced the 6,075 t its own figures assume FAS (Alice Wu, Jul 15 2025)
more than a year's DPA purchase budget, if prices fall — C2ES sets the floor against the money behind it, not a cost of its own: 'The fiscal year 2026 Defense Appropriations Act provides only $321.9 million for DPA purchases, which is potentially lower than just the annual payments for the price-floor commitment in the MP Materials deal if commodity prices fall'. Which account pays the floor, the record does not carry (note) C2ES, 'Securing the Critical Battery Materials Supply Chain in the Southeast United States'
$1.1B–2.1B in present value over the term — MIT CEEPR's expected cost of the floor net of the upside share, by scenario: about $2.1B with no price growth, $1.5B in its middle case, $1.1B with high growth (Apr 2026) MIT CEEPR commentary (Deese, Khan and Reese, Apr 2026)
$218.6M — MP's own value of the floor's rights at issuance, booked as the instruments' fair value above the cash (the 10-K's $768.6M against $550.0M): what the floor was worth to MP then, not a forecast of what the government pays. Recognized so far: $119.0M through Sep 30 2026 (our sum of the floor income in MP's 10-K and three 2026 10-Qs), the Q3 amount still receivable at Sep 30 MP 10-K FY2025; Q1-2026, Q2-2026 + Q3-2026 10-Qs (floor income since)
package-size3 positions, side by side
'multibillion-dollar' — MP's own words, 'a multibillion-dollar package of investments and long-term commitments' (8-K) and a 'multi-billion-dollar commitment' (launch deck), a phrase MP never adds up MP 8-K + deck (Jul 10 2025)
$550.0M of cash — $400.0M for the preferred at closing and the $150.0M loan in Aug 2025 (MP's 10-K); $768.6M counting the floor's value in MP's accounting. The rest is contingent: the floor and the offtake pay by price and output, and the bank commitment and the right to sell more preferred lapsed unused MP 10-K FY2025
$0.9B–2.7B — MIT CEEPR's present value of all federal support to MP under the deal, about $1.5B in its middle case, as much as 45% of the expected value of MP's output over the agreement MIT CEEPR commentary (Deese, Khan and Reese, Apr 2026)
stake-gain4 positions, side by side
~$700M — MP's figure, in its EVP Matt Sloustcher's written House testimony (Nov 19 2025): 'Based on our current market capitalization, this stake has generated approximately $700 million in unrealized gains for taxpayers' MP testimony, House Select Committee on the CCP (Nov 19 2025)
>$465M — Semafor, paraphrasing a Pentagon spokesperson, writes that the equity investment 'has already netted more than $465 million' (Sep 21 2026); no date, price or method given; through Sep 30 2026 the government had neither converted the preferred nor exercised the warrant (Q3-2026 10-Q) Semafor (Sep 21 2026); MP Q3-2026 10-Q
~50% — Adamas Intelligence (Jul 14 2025): 'Mark-to-market, the DoD's $400 million investment has already yielded a ~50% return, with MP Materials' stock surging following the announcement, boosting its market capitalization by $2.5 billion' — about $200M on the $400M (our arithmetic). The surge was the announcement day's: MP's shares 'soared about 50% to close at $45.23' on Jul 10 2025, its market capitalization up to $7.4B (CNBC), and on that morning's deal call MP's CEO, James Litinsky, told an analyst 'As a taxpayer, you have a very large mark-to-market gain this morning'. Neither MP's, Semafor's nor Adamas's figure says it nets out what flows the other way: $119.0M of floor income through Sep 30 2026 (our sum), and the $218.6M of value that, in MP's accounting, the government paid for by granting the floor — spread across the preferred, the warrant and the loan, not the stake alone Adamas Intelligence (Jul 14 2025); CNBC via NBC New York + MP deal call (Jul 10 2025); MP 10-K FY2025 + Q3-2026 10-Q (what flows back)
$360M — MIT CEEPR's value of the equity to the government, the one stake position on file that sets out a method: a subsidy of about $200M in the preferred (a 12.5% discount rate, held about 13 years) and roughly $560M for the warrant (CBO's TARP method, a modified Black-Scholes), taken together as 'net government savings of $360 million', its midpoint — 'on the whole it is an above-market investment'. It adds that 'any potential upside the U.S. government might realize from its equity position is effectively built on the back of the broader subsidy package it is simultaneously providing', which it puts at about $1.5B (package-size) MIT CEEPR commentary (Deese, Khan and Reese, Apr 2026)
closing2 positions, side by side
Jul 10 2025 — the warrant was issued on Jul 10 and expires on Jul 10 2035 (Q2-2026 quarterly report), MP's board authorized the preferred's designation on Jul 10 (Q3-2025 10-Q and the annual report) — the certificate itself was to be filed, and take effect, on the closing date — and MP's resale prospectus dates the registration rights agreement, which the 8-K has signed on the closing date, Jul 10 (424B7) MP Q3-2025 + Q2-2026 10-Qs + 10-K FY2025; 8-K Item 5.03 (Jul 10 2025); 424B7 (Aug 15 2025)
Jul 11 2025 — the date the Transaction Agreement sets for the closing (§2.01), the 8-K's defined 'Closing Date', the dates in the filed forms of the warrant, the preferred's certificate of designations and the registration rights agreement, and the release's 'scheduled to close on July 11, 2025'; MP ended its buyback on Jul 11 'pursuant to the terms of the DoW Transaction Agreements' (Q3-2025 10-Q), and Reuters had the deal 'expected to close on Friday'. No later filing on file states the closing date outright MP 8-K + exhibits + release (Jul 10 2025); Q3-2025 10-Q; Reuters via Investing.com
market-at-signing3 positions, side by side
$63–63.28/kg — Argus's China NdPr benchmark, 452–454 yuan/kg ex-works on Jul 10 2025, against which it called the floor 'a premium of more than $40/kg'; a wire story on Kitco (Feb 18 2026) dates that level to the signing day, the Chinese benchmark having risen to $123 a kilogram 'from $63 on July 9, when MP Materials unveiled its multibillion-dollar deal with the U.S.' Argus (Jul 10 2025); Kitco wire story (Feb 18 2026)
~$60/kg — 'the current market price of $60/kg' (FAS, Jul 15 2025), and NdPr oxide 'was being priced at $60 a kilogram' earlier in 2025 (J.P. Morgan's Castaldo); MP's own realized price had been $57 in Q2 2025 (its Q2-2025 10-Q), and MP's launch deck charts NdPr at the same level as FAS, on 'NdPr price data per Bloomberg' as at late June FAS; J.P. Morgan; MP Q2-2025 10-Q; MP launch deck (Jul 10 2025)
in the $50s/kg — MP's CFO, Ryan Corbett, recalling it a year later at J.P. Morgan's conference (Jun 23 2026): 'When we announced the deal, I believe NdPr market pricing was in the $50s'. His own hedge ('I believe'), a year after the fact, and below both readings above MP CFO at J.P. Morgan conference (Jun 23 2026)
legal-basis2 positions, side by side
authorized — the department assured MP that it has 'all requisite authority' under Title III of the Defense Production Act 'as well as other authorities' (8-K), and the Transaction Agreement, the price protection agreement and the offtake each record its determination that MP's performance is necessary for it to continue activities that, if not continued, 'would present an emergency situation involving the safety of human life and the protection of property'; in a June 2025 legal opinion that Semafor reviewed, OMB's general counsel argued that the deal was exempt from the law barring spending without Congress because it was 'necessary to avoid an imminent threat to human life and government property', and that the Pentagon would rely on the DPA, annual defense legislation from 2017 and Article II of the Constitution; a Pentagon spokesperson told Semafor that the equity investment was made using authorities granted by the Defense Production Act, and that both it and the loan were authorized by law MP 8-K (Jul 10 2025) + Transaction Agreement §5.02(b), PPA §8(r) and offtake §7.1.6 (8-K exhibits 10.1, 10.6, 10.5), tier 1; Semafor (Sep 21 2026), tier 2
questioned — MP's own 8-K flags the 'unconventional use of DPA Title III authority'; Lawfare (Benjamin Press, Sep 10 2026) argues that DPA spending above $50M 'must be previously authorized by Congress', with no waiver disclosed, that the DPA likely does not reach equity stakes, and that OMB had asked for language in the annual defense authorization act granting the department that authority, which no law added; Sen. Reed told the Feb 24 2026 SASC hearing that the legal basis 'appears questionable', read OMB's request for legislation as a sign that the administration itself sees the current authority as uncertain, and asked whether a deal relying on future appropriations complies with the Antideficiency Act — the assistant secretary of defense for industrial base policy answered that he had not analyzed it himself and that the department had relied on its Office of General Counsel and its legislative affairs teams (the rest of his answer is under appropriations); a former Pentagon official told Semafor that the Antideficiency Act was 'one of the hurdles we thought was going to be insurmountable' for the deal, and a former OSC official 'I think this pushes the boundaries' MP 8-K; Lawfare (Sep 10 2026); SASC transcript (Feb 24 2026); Semafor (Sep 21 2026)

For context, not this deal's figures 1 kept beside the deal so they are not mistaken for its numbers

  • dpa-expiry
    the expiry date in the Defense Production Act, the law the department cites for the equity (legal-basis): the continuing-appropriations law approved Sep 2 2026 moved it from Sep 30 2026 to Dec 11 2026 (Public Law 119-103, Division B, §2004). Semafor wrote on Sep 21 2026 that 'Trump’s Defense Production Act authority is slated to lapse at the end of the month' and that 'If lawmakers don’t extend it, the cornerstone of the Pentagon’s legal argument will evaporate' — nineteen days after that extension was law. No later extension is on file. A date in the statute, not a term of this deal
    “Section 717(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4564(a)) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2026'' and inserting ``December 11, 2026''.”
    Public Law 119-103 (Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027, approved Sep 2 2026), §2004 · govinfo.gov

Scope note what this record leaves to other records

NOT this record (routed elsewhere or not carried here): Apple — a $500M supply agreement for magnets from MP's Independence plant in Fort Worth and a recycling line at Mountain Pass, signed in Jul 2025 (Jul 15 in MP's 8-K Item 8.01, Jul 14 in its Q2-2025 10-Q; Apple's newsroom: 'a new commitment of $500 million'), with $200.0M of prepayments as milestones are met, $80.0M received or collectible by Sep 30 2026 ($72.0M received by Jun 30 2026, $8.0M a receivable at Sep 30) and none yet recognized as revenue (Q3-2026 10-Q), deliveries from 'no earlier than the latter half of 2027' (Q2-2026 10-Q; the Q3 10-Q gives no start date) — one buyer's consumer-electronics allocation, carried on the mpmaterials entity; MP's Saudi refinery venture with the department and Maaden (Nov 19 2025) → a separate deal, no record; MP's July 2025 stock offering and its revolver → only as they touch funding-requirement and bank-commitment; the state and local incentives for 10X (a package 'totaling roughly $200 million over more than a decade', which 'includes more than $66 million in grants', per MP's 10X site release; 'approximately $200 million' in its 2026 10-Qs), 10X's jobs (MP's count and the tax-abatement terms'), MP's earlier federal awards, the DPA Fund's cap and OSC's lending authority, which account pays the floor and the offtake, US magnet demand, post-deal NdPr prices by region and date, and a Q2-2026 call figure two transcripts render a thousandfold apart → not carried here. The cost figures in the tax-abatement filings and in the state's architectural-barriers registrations of two 10X buildings were positions on 10X's cost, a question the record resolves (10x-cost). Legal basis: two positions, because nothing on file settles it. Not adopted: a RUSI commentary's 'price floor of $100 per kg' and its 'In June' (Henry Sanderson, Aug 15 2025; the filed PPA says $110, the agreements Jul 9); Reuters' '$52 per kilogram' for 'the second quarter' (MP's Q1 2025 price; Q2's was $57); MIT CEEPR's '4,000 shares' (400,000); Hogan Lovells' '$30.031/share' (the deck's $30.03 with a footnote 1 run into it) and its '10,000 MT' for 10X (block-equivalent, or company-wide; 7,000 t finished); Sen. Reed's magnets at $110 a kilogram from 2028 (the floor covers NdPr from Oct 2025; the magnets go at production cost plus the guaranteed EBITDA under the offtake); Fox Business's headline 'invests $500M' for Apple's purchase commitment (its body: 'expected to announce a $500 million commitment'). Not circular, though close-knit: the government is shareholder, lender, price-floor payer and buyer of last resort of one supplier, so MP's floor income comes from the department that holds its stock, and so will 10X's magnet revenue unless the department asks or lets MP sell elsewhere — which MP's CEO expects for almost all of the plant's capacity ('It's likely that as we start to bring that facility online, we will end up contracting almost all of that capacity to industry', Aug 6 2026 call), and its Q3-2026 10-Q describes Project Swarm, through which drone and motor manufacturers 'may reserve future magnet production capacity from the 10X Facility' (project-swarm); in MP's accounting part of the value of the preferred, warrant and loan at issuance was paid for with the floor itself. The customer-finances-supplier shape of micron-globalwafers, with the state as the customer: MP's upside share is not payment for the government's goods, so nothing returns to it as its own revenue.

More between US government and MP Materials

The record holds no other deal between them.

Everything between US government and MP Materials →